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BISHOP ALFRED TUCKER AND THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF A BRITISH  
PROTECTORATE IN UGANDA 1890-94

BY

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ABSTRACT

The article considers the involvement of Bishop Alfred Tucker and other missionaries of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) in the establishment of a British Protectorate in Buganda between 1890 and 1894. These missionaries were drawn, often not unwillingly, into political affairs, both within Uganda and internationally. The contribution made by Tucker was frequently ill-informed and sometimes tendentious. Nevertheless, he sought to uphold the long-standing CMS regulation that missionaries should abstain from any political involvement. The theoretical distinction between the sacred and secular was alien to the intellectual heritage of Uganda, and in practice it was contradicted by the activities of CMS missionaries, who justified their involvement in terms of considering Uganda to be a 'special case'.

The purpose of this article is to examine the involvement of Bishop A.R. Tucker in the establishment of a British Protectorate in Uganda between 1890 and 1894. During this period Tucker was Bishop of Eastern Equatorial Africa, a vast diocese that included what subsequently became the country of Uganda. In 1897 Tucker became Bishop in Uganda alone, a post which he held until his retirement in 1911. The focus is on Tucker's understanding of the evangelical tradition of political involvement which he had inherited from Venn, the influential secretary of the Church Missionary Society (1841-1872), and the ways in which he sought to implement this tradition during the early years of his episcopate. It is one of the more curious aspects of Tucker's episcopate that between 1890 and 1894 he only spent a matter of seven months in Uganda itself. His involvement in political affairs concerning Uganda was hardly founded on any profound knowledge of the country.<sup>1</sup>

*The Venn Tradition*

There was a long-standing Regulation in the Church Missionary Society (CMS) that 'Every missionary is strictly charged to abstain from interfering in the political affairs of the country or place in which he may be situated.'<sup>2</sup> Henry Venn was sanguine that missionaries who worked in regions and countries under British political control would, under normal circumstances, be able to carry out their work without concerning themselves with political matters. Nevertheless he recognised that the Regulation could not be absolute, because he acknowledged that concern for Christian principles necessarily involved missionaries and national Christians in questions that were otherwise considered to be purely political by the secular authorities. Slavery was an issue that answered this description. In Venn's 1860 'Instructions to Missionaries', which explained and clarified the basic Regulations, he laid out some basic principles of political involvement. Missionaries should only consider taking up a supposed grievance after discussion with other, preferably more experienced, missionaries; and when the issue '*palpably* [italics original] involved the great principles of justice, humanity or Christian duty.'<sup>3</sup> He emphasised that the missionary should always avoid political partisanship and always be sure to be cordial and courteous in the presentation of his case. Clearly Venn was concerned to keep the level of political involvement by CMS missionaries to a minimum without foreclosing on the possibility that some involvement might occasionally be necessary and even desirable. When he wrote in 1860 the majority of CMS missionaries worked in areas where there was some level of British political control, and the examples that he gave of approved involvement by missionaries all related to these areas and to situations where the grievance was expressed against British authorities. Venn was much less comfortable with the questions of the political relationships of CMS missionaries with non-Christian and non-European governments and political structures and paid relatively little attention to this question. He acknowledged that the 'injunction to abstain from all interference with political affairs is obviously not applicable when the native government is mixed up with national superstitions and social institutions which violate all justice and humanity; when the magistrate's sword is in the hands of every petty chief or self-constituted oppressor.'<sup>4</sup> As appropriate to this situation he quoted the explanatory clause which had been added to the CMS Regulations during the time of Pratt's Secretariat (1802-24): 'It is not intended, however, by this regulation to preclude missionaries who may be stationed in New Zealand, or in

the other regions which are uncivilised and which do not enjoy the protection of a fixed Government, from bringing the natives acquainted with such Christian and civil institutions, as in process of time their situation may require; or from using their influence in such countries to preserve or restore peace in conformity with the spirit of a minister of the Gospel.' As an example of the application of this principle Venn offered the prominent role played by CMS missionaries in persuading Maori chiefs to sign the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. This example opened the door wide for missionaries to equate stable and peaceful rule with the process of colonisation, and it did little to encourage a positive evaluation of non-Christian and non-European political structures. Moreover it was too indefinite and vague to enable missionaries to engage critically with the situation of operating within a framework of traditional structures.

### *Tucker's Political Thinking*

The history of the missionary work of the Church of England in Uganda is inseparably bound up with the political history of the protectorate of Uganda as a development of the Colonial policy of Great Britain. This close connection has been due to the peculiar circumstance of the case.<sup>5</sup>

With these words Tucker began his report on the relation between missions and government in Uganda for the World Missionary Conference which met at Edinburgh in 1910. He explained this close connection on the grounds of the peculiar circumstances in the country. The first CMS missionaries arrived in Buganda in 1877 before any European political agent. It was natural, he argued, that when such political agents reached the country the missionaries would be consulted both by their fellow Europeans and by the Africans. When they were consulted under these circumstances the missionaries were obliged to offer appropriate advice. Tucker considered that to have failed to do so would have constituted a 'grave dereliction of duty'.<sup>6</sup> Such political activity was in response to the initiative of others, either European or African. Tucker acknowledged a mediating function on the part of the missionaries with regard to the Treaty concluded between Mwangi, Kabaka (King) of Uganda, and Lugard in 1890; the Treaty signed between the Kabaka and chiefs of Uganda and Sir Gerald Portal in 1893; and the Treaty signed in 1900 between the political leaders of Buganda and Sir Harry Johnston on behalf of the British Government. As a result of this co-operation, Tucker indicated that a cordial relationship existed between the political authorities and the mission.

Tucker continued to outline two general principles: firstly, that he was 'entirely opposed to missionaries mixing themselves up in the political affairs of the country in which their lot is cast.'<sup>7</sup> However, the particular circumstances of Uganda had created an exceptional case. The second principle was that all political involvement and assistance had to be channelled through the administrative director of the mission. He went on to consider the circumstances under which a mission could appeal to the civil authorities for protection of life or property. As a rule he felt that this should not be done. He addressed the question of whether the mission had compromised this rule in 1892 in appealing to the British Government to take over Uganda when the Imperial British East Africa (IBEA) Company threatened to pull out. He argued that the ground for this appeal was not the protection of the mission itself, but that the Government had already compromised the position of both European and African Christians and was therefore bound to see that they did not suffer. This consideration was best addressed by according protectorate status to Uganda.

Tucker wrote the paper for the Edinburgh Conference from his standpoint as Bishop and Director of the mission in Uganda, and he focused particularly on the relationship between the CMS mission and the British, rather than the African, political authorities. This reflected the political realities of 1910. Nevertheless the paper serves as a useful introduction to a discussion of Tucker's own political involvement and his thoughts about the political relationship of the Church with the state during the whole of his episcopate.

### *Uganda--a Unique Case?*

In spite of making the conventional statement that he was 'entirely opposed to missionaries mixing themselves up with the political affairs of the country',<sup>8</sup> Tucker twice alluded to the peculiar circumstances of Uganda that necessitated some involvement by missionaries in political affairs. But it is far from convincing to argue that Uganda was unique or even unusual.

In the 1860s the British Government was seriously considering withdrawal from all territories in West Africa where it had an interest, except for Sierra Leone. The response of the missionaries of the Basel Missionary Society who were working in the Gold Coast was to engage in strong lobbying of Parliament in London. One Basel missionary, Elias Schrenk, drew up a memorandum, a copy of which was presented to every member of Parliament, laying great emphasis on the

responsibilities of Britain both to 'spread the blessings of knowledge and to make reparation for the grave injuries that Europe had inflicted on Africa.'<sup>9</sup> The argument was heard and plans for departure from the Gold Coast were abandoned.<sup>10</sup>

In Nigeria the establishment of British authority in Yorubaland has been attributed largely to the activities of CMS missionaries. E.A. Ayendele has highlighted the activity of the Revd J.B. Wood who willingly played a mediating role between Egba and Yoruba chiefs and between these and British authorities in Lagos.<sup>11</sup> Wood had the deep conviction that 'in the circumstances of Yorubaland, the missionary could make headway only by becoming part of its politics. . . . He identified himself with Egba politics until his death.'<sup>12</sup>

In Nyasaland<sup>13</sup> missionaries were involved in political activity both at the local level and in lobbying in Britain for Protectorate status for the territory. In the 1880s the warring Tonga and Ngoni ethnic groups tried to enlist the help of the missionaries against their enemies. The Tonga in particular responded to the mission and frequently appealed to the missionaries in cases of local dispute to arbitrate between the elders.<sup>14</sup> Donald Fraser wrote that the Livingstonia Mission 'helped to peg out the claims and make imperious demands for British administration.'<sup>15</sup> He referred to the campaign, based in Scotland, to persuade the Government to declare Protectorate status over Nyasaland. A British Protectorate of the Nyasaland District was declared in May 1891. Commenting on the difference that this made to the political involvement of the missionaries, McCracken wrote: 'Hitherto missionaries, even when they attempted to stand aloof, had participated actively in the local scene as equals and sometimes as subordinates to the neighbouring authorities. Now, though they might continue to participate with far fewer obstacles and uncertainties than before, their political actions tended increasingly to be defined in relationship not to African politics but to those of the colonial regime. The closer the political interests of the missionary lay to those of the administrator, the more likely it was that the Africans would regard the one as the extension of the other.'<sup>16</sup>

We shall find that a very similar analysis could be made of the situation within Uganda. So even brief analysis of the situations in the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Nyasaland indicates that it was not unusual in sub-Saharan Africa for missionaries to be involved in political affairs at both local and international levels. It was misleading for Tucker to claim that the involvement of missionaries in the politics of Uganda was a response to peculiar circumstances. Rather his words were a disingenuous attempt to maintain the fiction that missionaries stood

aloof from political life in the countries where they worked. It would have been more accurate to have claimed that the *shape* of CMS involvement was formed by the peculiar circumstances of Uganda.

### *Missionary Involvement in Ugandan Politics before 1890*

In his Edinburgh paper Tucker asserted that the missionaries were often drawn into political involvement through the initiative of others, both European and African, on the basis of their relative experience of both worlds and a corresponding ability to interpret the one to the other. This was true in the nineteenth-century period of missionary presence in Uganda. It is clear that there were a number of attempts by European political authorities to solicit the agency of either individual missionaries or the mission as a whole. When the Revd Philip O'Flaherty went to Buganda in 1880 he took a brief from the Foreign Office in London to keep them 'informed of the facts.'<sup>17</sup> Later the IBEA Company attempted to co-opt Mackay in 1889, actually empowering him to offer African chiefs the advantage of trade and general intercourse in using his influence to persuade them to declare for the English in preference to the Germans.<sup>18</sup>

Traditional society in Buganda had long been dominated by power struggles between chiefs, who operated in factions. A successful Kabaka was one who played these factions against each other without being dominated by any of them in particular. By the mid-1880s these traditional factions had crystallised around religion, such that four broad groupings may be identified: the traditionalist 'pagan' group, the Muslims, the Catholics and the Protestants. Mwanga had failed to control them, and had been expelled from Buganda in 1888, following a coup led by the Muslim party, who then installed Kalema as their puppet Kabaka. The Protestant and Catholic coalition which formed in 1889 to oust Kalema, and replace him with their own candidate, Mwanga (now promising good behaviour), wanted the presence and support of the CMS missionaries who were in exile south of the Lake at their mission station at Nassa. Initially the reaction of the two missionaries at Nassa, Robert Walker and E.C. Gordon, was to remain there and engage in spiritual work, but within a month they decided to join the Protestant Baganda.<sup>19</sup> They also advised the Protestant chiefs, who invited their support, to desist from the invasion and settle where they could develop spiritually. But such advice was ignored.<sup>20</sup> Walker was very aware of the limitations of any political advice that the missionaries were able to give. He informed Mwanga in 1889 that the

missionaries had nothing to do with the political acts of the Protestant leaders. He felt that they did not understand the people and their situation sufficiently to be able to offer helpful advice.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, Walker did feel that he and the other missionaries were able to offer some advice when asked about external affairs. The failure of the first attempt by the Christians to expel Kalema led them to consider favourably the assistance of any forces that might be supplied by the IBEA Company and on this matter they approached Walker to ask his advice. He encouraged them to seek such an alliance and emphasised the philanthropic concerns of the Company.<sup>22</sup> The second attempt of the Christians succeeded in ousting Kalema and reinstating Mwanga. The Muslim party fled to neighbouring Bunyoro. There ensued in Buganda an uneasy truce between the Christian factions, who remained aware of the potential threat posed by the Muslim group.

When Lugard came to Buganda in 1890 as the chief representative of the IBEA Company, he had been given to understand that his natural allies were the Protestant chiefs; at the same time the CMS missionaries were looking to the Company to perform a peace-making role in the country. This latter expectation in practice was compromised by the desire to support the Protestant chiefs in their power struggle with the Catholic faction. This was expressed clearly by Walker that 'whilst I am here, I feel it is my duty to see that the IBEA Company is playing fair with the Protestant chiefs.'<sup>23</sup> One example of this in practice came in 1891 when Walker wrote to Lugard about the division of the Ssesse islands between the Protestant and the Catholic chiefs. He argued that Mwanga, who had at this stage identified himself with the Catholic group, had gone back on his word by refusing now to divide the islands, and that Lugard was showing favouritism towards the Catholics by his support for Mwanga in this decision.<sup>24</sup> Behind this one can hear the voice of grievance felt by the Protestant chiefs who were using Walker as their (not unwilling) advocate. In addition to seeing the missionaries as a useful channel of communication with Lugard, the Protestant chiefs consulted the missionaries for explanation of Lugard's words and actions.<sup>25</sup>

Much of the advice given by missionaries was intended to discourage the Protestant chiefs in their political ambitions. Indeed Gordon as early as 1890 feared that the Protestant chiefs were becoming too ambitious for power and that this was leading them to an undesirable and unbending spirit towards the Catholic chiefs.<sup>26</sup> The missionaries were not aware that their European intellectual heritage led them to make clear theoretical distinctions between the spiritual and the secular realms whereas these distinctions were entirely foreign to the Baganda. Neither



was it evident from the activities of the missionaries themselves what this distinction meant in practice. What the missionaries perceived as an unwholesome mix of politics and religion was a perfectly natural integration to the Baganda Protestant Christians, who preferred to argue that, because they had fought for and reconquered the country, they did not see why they should allow their Catholic rivals to dominate the political arena.<sup>27</sup> The Protestant claim of victory in the power struggle over Buganda was clearly untrue and represents a none too subtle attempt to pull wool over the missionaries' eyes. The relationship between the missionaries and the Protestant chiefs in this period was such that the latter were eager to receive the support and advice of the former wherever possible as well as eager to hear their interpretation of Lugard's actions and statements. But they were by no means inclined to follow any given advice that did not correspond with their own thinking.<sup>28</sup>

#### *Lugard and the CMS Missionaries 1890-91*

Tucker's personal involvement in the politics of Uganda began even before his arrival in the country. While he was preparing in Mombasa for his safari to Uganda in August 1890, he met regularly with Colonel Euan-Smith and Captain Lugard of the IBEA Company to discuss the points that Lugard intended to present to the Kabaka.<sup>29</sup> Lugard travelled in advance of Tucker, taking his prepared Treaty to Mwanga. In Buganda he shared the main points with the CMS missionaries Walker and Gordon with a view to their enlisting the support of the Protestant chiefs.<sup>30</sup> However, Mwanga refused to be pressurised and delayed signing until 26 December 1890. When Tucker arrived he met Lugard almost daily; unfortunately neither man recorded details of these conversations.<sup>31</sup> One small glimpse may be found in Tucker's letter to Lugard in early January 1891 telling him that the Protestant chiefs were aggrieved, thinking that Lugard was showing greater favour to the Catholics.<sup>32</sup> This was by no means the first or last time that the Protestant chiefs sought to involve the missionaries in their own political agenda. Tucker briefly met with the French Fathers and they discussed some of the grievances of the chiefs, but little came of these meetings.

Any influence that Tucker may have had in the country was considerably diminished by his short stay, during which he was hardly able to grasp the complexities of its politics. The Revd R.P. Ashe was the senior CMS missionary in Uganda, having been in the country since 1882. He was particularly scathing about Tucker's involvement: 'The bishop left in less than a month, apparently under the impression that

he had been instrumental in effecting a settlement of the difficulties by a hurried conference with the French Fathers, the results of which however as one might have expected proved valueless.<sup>33</sup> The superficiality of Tucker's grasp was reflected in his comment to Wigram, the CMS Africa Secretary in London, that he was convinced that following Lugard's Treaty 'things will settle down and justice be done to both parties.'<sup>34</sup>

After Tucker had left early in 1891, and following the signing of the Treaty between Mwanga and Lugard on behalf of the IBEA Company, Lugard was very conscious that political relationships between the Company and the Kabaka and chiefs were his business and not that of the missionaries, whether CMS or White Fathers. When a letter came from Sir Francis de Winton, the Mombasa administrator of the Company, which suggested that the Kabaka and chiefs should go to the English Bishop for advice and assistance, Lugard was most indignant. He interpreted this as a trespass on his own sphere.<sup>35</sup> Combined with this was Lugard's notorious sensitivity to anything that could be construed as personal criticism. This partly explains Lugard's general unwillingness to consult with the missionaries on any political matter. On the other hand the CMS missionaries had a naïve expectation that Lugard should favour the Protestant party because he was British and at least nominally belonged to the Church of England. The alliance between the Protestant and Catholic chiefs in 1889 had been specifically to expel the Muslims from power in Buganda. When the two Christian parties had achieved this, their power struggle resumed. It broke into civil war in 1892. The outbreak of hostilities forced Lugard's hand so that he had to choose which party to support. He supplied the Protestants with additional arms in January 1892 and at a crucial point in the battle with the Catholics turned his maxim gun on the latter, but in the aftermath of the civil war he made a conscious effort towards reconciliation of the various factions including the Muslims. The CMS missionaries felt that Lugard should have consulted them more and were resentful, especially since in 1891 many CMS supporters in Britain had assisted the Company in raising the necessary funds to keep it in Uganda. Walker once went so far as to say that he did not see that 'it would be too much to ask that the agents of the IBEA Company here should do nothing that the united body of CMS missionaries believe to be disadvantageous to its interests'.<sup>36</sup> It was indeed too much to ask in Lugard's opinion because he had no sympathy whatever with this argument.

One question that arose during the time when Lugard was absent from the capital in Ankole and Toro in 1891 was that of religious liberty.<sup>37</sup>

This showed up the contradiction in the position of the CMS missionaries in attempting to defend both the principle that chiefs should be free under British rule to choose their religion and the principle that they should be expelled from their chieftainships should they change their religion. The Revd George Baskerville, a CMS missionary who had arrived in Uganda with Tucker in 1890, made a valiant if unconvincing attempt to hold the principles together in his Journal entry for 13 July 1891 and in a letter that he subsequently sent to Captain Williams, the deputy whom Lugard had left in charge in Buganda.<sup>38</sup> He made the following points: that, should Williams declare absolute religious liberty, trouble would inevitably ensue, and that while supporting the principle of religious liberty, the peculiar nature of Kiganda politics was such that it would be the Protestant party that would lose members and land to the Catholic party. This was because the Kabaka was, at that time, nominally of the latter affiliation. Finally he argued that such a procedure would lead the Protestant party to lose all confidence in the IBEA Company. The arguments here would have carried more credibility without the assertion that he supported religious liberty. It was clear that he did not do so in this context.

The most politically aware of the CMS missionaries was Ashe, who had been a contemporary of Lugard's in school. He typically tended to exaggerate the influence that the missionaries had over the Protestant chiefs, but he was prepared to admit freely to Lugard that he sought to advise those who came to him in spite of the CMS policy of avoiding political issues wherever possible.<sup>39</sup>

The period of Company rule in Buganda was a problematic one for both the Company agents and the CMS Missionaries in the country. While both recognised the value of mutual support, Lugard and Williams felt beleaguered and were sensitive towards any attitude that they considered fell short of whole-hearted support.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand the missionaries were uncertain of their political objectives and struggled to hold on to contradictory principles. Tucker was away from Uganda for most of this period, and he offered no guidance to the missionaries remaining in Buganda, nor yet did he appoint anyone to take special responsibility for political matters.

#### *Tucker and the Campaign to 'Retain' Uganda*

When Tucker left Mombasa for England on 27 April 1891, his intention was to find men and money for the work in Uganda. He appealed for forty men to join the mission at his welcoming meeting at Exeter

Hall in London on 2 June,<sup>41</sup> but he was soon to find himself engaged with another purpose. That month he became aware of rumours that the IBEA Company was considering withdrawal from Uganda because it was facing bankruptcy. This was confirmed at a meeting of the Directors on 16 July.<sup>42</sup> Tucker's response was immediate: he wrote to Sir Fowell Buxton, the Treasurer of CMS and a director of the Company, outlining the reasons why he opposed the decision. His argument was that the position of the CMS mission in Uganda had changed as a consequence of the arrival of the Company. For the previous fourteen or so years CMS missionaries had been in the country without looking for any protection from any foreign government. During that time a large number of people had become Christians. For some time in Uganda there had been a political struggle between the Protestant, Roman Catholic, Muslim and pagan parties. When Jackson and Gedge arrived in 1890 as the first representatives of the IBEA Company, it was only the Protestants who welcomed them and were willing to accept the prepared treaty that they offered to Mwanga. It was a similar story when Lugard came later in the year. The Protestants exerted their influence to persuade the Catholics and the Kabaka to accept the treaty offered them. This action of the Protestants compromised them in the eyes of their fellow countrymen. Tucker continued to argue that, should the IBEA Company withdraw from Uganda, the result would be the dispersal of the converts and the probable destruction of the mission. He underlined the fact that all the CMS missionaries were British subjects. In his opinion the actions of the Company had compromised the neutrality of the missionaries. Tucker alluded to a letter written by Lugard which stated that, unless the Christians co-operated, he would be forced to withdraw, which would mean the end of the mission. In response to this letter the Protestants exerted their influence on Lugard's behalf. Besides this Tucker argued that the Company had an obligation following the Treaty with Mwanga. It would not be possible for the missionaries to withdraw and abandon the converts should the Company depart. He argued that the British government had a responsibility within Uganda because of the Agreement with Germany in 1890, which committed the country to the sphere of British influence. Moreover the IBEA Company had been acting as the agent of the British and was in fact indistinguishable from the British government in the eyes of Ugandans. Tucker concluded his letter: 'But I will not attempt further to show how the responsibility in the matter rests upon either the Company or the government. . . . I will only say that should the Company withdraw from Uganda and the result be (as I believe

in all probability it will be) the destruction of the mission and the death of our missionaries, that the whole of a very solemn responsibility for such a terrible disaster will rest equally upon the IBEA Company and H.M.'s government.<sup>43</sup>

Not for the last time did Tucker write such a tendentious letter, shamelessly conjuring up the shadows of General Gordon and of Hannington. He wrote with minimal knowledge of the situation within Uganda, offering no evidence for his assertions on behalf of the Protestant Christians of Buganda who had after all been looking after themselves with a fair degree of success up to this point. The letter was significant, however, in that it was written only two weeks after the Directors of the Company had made the decision to withdraw from Uganda, indicating the close contact between the institutions of the CMS and the Company. Buxton epitomised this link by being on the Boards of both societies. Tucker's letter was followed in August by a meeting between General Hutchinson, a prominent member of the CMS committee and a former Lay Secretary, and General Sir Arnold Kemball of the Company, who warned the Society that they required more than sympathy to enable the Company to remain in Uganda.<sup>44</sup> It was the following month that Tucker and two members of the CMS Committee met by coincidence Sir William Mackinnon in Scotland.<sup>45</sup> The latter explained the need of the Company for some forty thousand pounds to enable them to remain in Buganda for another year. He was assured that the CMS could not use its funds for such a purpose, but it was felt appropriate that an appeal could be made to the friends of the Society. A draft appeal was written and Sir John Kennaway and General Hutchinson agreed in principle to become the Trustees of a proposed Uganda Guarantee Fund. Little more was done at this stage, although opinion was hardening within the CMS Africa Committee that it was essential to the work of the mission in Uganda that the Company should remain.<sup>46</sup> A Special General Committee meeting of the CMS was held on 29 September, at which Tucker spoke of the necessity of the Company remaining, and it was resolved to send a memorial to Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, to request government support for this purpose. In the meantime it was understood that any question of issuing a general appeal should be deferred until Salisbury had replied.<sup>47</sup> On 28 October there was a meeting between some of the CMS Committee and Directors of the IBEA Company at which the CMS representatives agreed to promote a fund to support the Company in Uganda. Tucker was planning to return to East Africa. His farewell coincided with the Annual Meeting of the Gleaners' Union, one of the auxiliaries of the CMS, at

the Exeter Hall on 30 October.<sup>48</sup> He spoke powerfully of the needs of Uganda. This was followed immediately by an appeal from Eugene Stock, the influential Publications Secretary of CMS, who stressed the urgency of a response to the Uganda Guarantee Fund. This Fund was jointly sponsored by CMS and the IBEA Company, but it was not directly under CMS auspices. He announced that friends of the Society were expected to contribute £15,000 of which some £1,600 had been received. The response was overwhelming and within ten days £16,000 had been given or pledged.<sup>49</sup> Tucker, Kennaway and Hutchinson followed up the Exeter Hall appeal with a private letter of appeal to various wealthy individuals at the start of November on the same day that a telegram was sent to Mombasa to notify Lugard that he should remain in Buganda.<sup>50</sup> Being assured of the success of the appeal Tucker left London to return to Mombasa on 2 December.

At most a respite had been bought for the IBEA Company to remain in Uganda through 1892, and so there was continuing activity throughout the year in Britain to put pressure on the government to take responsibility for Uganda. Added impetus was given to this campaign by the involvement of H.M. Stanley and Captain Lugard who had by this time returned to Britain.<sup>51</sup> CMS publications during the year included Sarah Stock's *Uganda: Its Story and its Claim*, arguing that the British Government should take over responsibility for Uganda. A book of Tucker's sketches was produced with a foreword arguing that a British withdrawal from Uganda would be disastrous in its effects. One fruit of this campaign was that 147 sets of resolutions, 11 memorials and 16 petitions urging the retention of Uganda were received by the government.<sup>52</sup> It is noticeable that from this time the words 'retain' and 'retention' became the common currency in the debate about the future of Britain's relationship with Uganda.

Meanwhile in East Africa for the first part of 1892, Tucker was largely taken up dealing with problems in Frere Town on the coast. Then in June 1892 he wrote to Sir Gerald Portal, the Commissioner-General of Zanzibar, to inform him that, in the event of any British withdrawal from Uganda, the CMS missionaries would nevertheless remain. He questioned Portal as to whether the British government would be prepared to take any steps towards the preservation of law and order in the country and argued that, if the British failed to act, then the Germans might respond to any situation of anarchy and appeals for help.<sup>53</sup> The latter was a shrewd argument on his part, because Tucker was well aware that if the British government was reluctant to take any responsibility in Uganda, it was even more reluctant to see

another European power do so. That Tucker succeeded in touching a raw nerve was indicated by the prompt reply from Portal that he had referred the Bishop's point to Lord Salisbury who in turn had assured him that 'the Germans will certainly not be at liberty to undertake any occupation of the British sphere.'<sup>54</sup>

Later in September 1892 Tucker wrote to Wigram, the Africa Secretary of CMS, to encourage him and the Society to use all their influence to bring the whole area in east Africa, that was considered to be a sphere of British influence, under a British Protectorate.<sup>55</sup> The fund raising of the previous year was only a short-term measure, enabling the IBEA Company to remain for one more year in Uganda. Tucker's concern now was to promote the longer term 'solution', as he saw it of a more formalised Protectorate status for Uganda. In the issue of *The Standard* of 13 September 1892, a letter was published by Tucker in which he argued that the war in Mengo in January 1892 had been between political rather than religious parties. He then drew the lesson that the war provided the object lesson of what might ensue should the British withdraw from Uganda. His letter concluded: '... the abandonment of Uganda means dishonour to the English name, the revival of the slave-trade in Central Africa, the absolute waste of all that has been spent in the development of the country, the dispersion of the Native Church, the murder of our missionaries, and the continued disorder and bloodshed of a State at war with itself.'<sup>56</sup> This is a remarkably audacious letter that piles on assertions without evidence. Its tendentious nature is exacerbated by the emotive tone adopted, and it can only be described as unworthy propaganda. The propaganda war of 1892 continued when a letter was sent by some leading Baganda Protestants to CMS in London: 'We Baganda are under the Queen's flag; we very much want the agents of the Company to stay in our country.'<sup>57</sup>

However, not all the letters received were so positive about the CMS campaign on behalf of the IBEA Company. The veteran missionary W. Salter Price, who had never worked in Uganda, had written in 1888 expressing his anxiety lest the CMS should identify itself too closely with the Company.<sup>58</sup> In line with this feeling he now wrote to Hutchinson about the Uganda Appeal: 'I am grieved, deeply grieved, to see the dear old ship drifting from her ancient moorings into a troubled sea. I shall be only too glad should the result prove my fears to be unfounded, but at present I shall think it a gracious interposition of Providence if the extraordinary appeal for funds meets with little response.'<sup>59</sup> In his opinion the active campaigning by prominent CMS figures on behalf of a British Protectorate went against the tradition established by Venn.

From within Uganda itself there was relative silence while Tucker was engaging in his campaign. The exception was Walker who was not impressed with the sentimental overstatement of many of the arguments deployed: 'I have seen statements which make it appear that the CMS in Buganda depends on the presence of the IBEA Company, and that were the IBEA Company to withdraw there would follow the destruction of the CMS etc etc. This is not at all the case.'<sup>60</sup> He thus highlighted the lack of evidence behind the more emotive appeals of Tucker and others.

### *Tucker and Portal's Commission*

The major event of Tucker's second visit to Uganda was the Commission of Sir Gerald Portal to determine the nature of Britain's relationship with Buganda following the departure of the IBEA Company. After his involvement in the propaganda campaign for the 'retention' of Uganda, Tucker was favourably disposed towards positive involvement in Portal's mission. Hearing of Tucker's plans to travel to Uganda in September 1892, Portal wrote to him that he should consider that he and his party would travel at their own risk and that the British authorities bore no responsibility for their welfare.<sup>61</sup> Tucker's immediate reply stated firmly that such a disclaimer did not relieve the Government of their responsibility. On the contrary the treaties signed by the IBEA Company had committed the Government to take responsibility.<sup>62</sup> It was not in Tucker's interests to allow Portal to draw clear distinctions between the IBEA Company and the British Government that might be used to justify a complete withdrawal from Uganda. Portal did not follow the matter up with Tucker, but he tacitly conceded the case.<sup>63</sup>

En route to Uganda Tucker's party met that of Captain Macdonald, who was returning from Uganda as an agent of the IBEA Company. Tucker handed over orders from the Company to Macdonald instructing him to return to Uganda. Macdonald saved Tucker from making a tactical blunder when he refused to travel together with the Bishop lest the Roman Catholics in Uganda should make capital of their close companionship.<sup>64</sup> On the same journey Tucker received the news that the British Government had decided to enable the IBEA Company to remain in Uganda until the end of March 1893. He correctly read the signs that this was a step in the direction of a commitment to a more permanent occupation of the country.<sup>65</sup> This was further confirmed by the announcement of a Commission under Sir Gerald Portal in November 1892. Tucker would have been even more heartened had he known



of the letter from Lord Rosebery, the Liberal Prime Minister, to Portal in December 1892, expressing his 'confident but not official opinion that public sentiment here will expect and support the maintenance of the British sphere of influence.'<sup>66</sup> This agreed with Portal's own opinion that withdrawal of British influence would lead to war and that his hand had already been forced by Lugard's activities within Uganda.

On his arrival in Uganda Tucker found that Captain Williams of the Company had plans to amend the treaty with Mwanga made by Lugard after the war in 1892 in order to respond to some of the grievances that had been felt by some of the Catholic chiefs in particular. However, Tucker's response was to deprecate any attempt to modify the status quo before Portal's arrival. He set out his reasons in a memorandum to Williams, arguing that those who wanted modification were rebellious against the Kabaka, that the whole question of Britain's involvement was under judicial review, and that there was current uncertainty as to the intentions of the British government.<sup>67</sup> Without conceding Tucker's points, Williams did not pursue his proposed amendments.

Sir Gerald Portal arrived with his entourage of eight men on 17 March 1893. He visited Tucker the next day; they dined together a couple of days later. The following week Tucker formally agreed that the missionaries should assist Portal in his work. 31 March 1893 saw the formal ending of the Company's involvement in Uganda, and this was followed by the raising of the Union flag on the next morning. This event had little immediate significance for the Baganda who understandably saw little if any distinction between the Company and the British government. In any case Lugard had used the British ensign freely instead of the Company flag and had been accustomed to present himself as an officer of the Queen.<sup>68</sup> In contrast the CMS missionaries saw this as the climax of what had begun at the meeting of the Gleaners' Union in 1891 and as a work of divine providence. Accordingly Tucker recorded that, after the raising of the Union flag, the missionaries all met for a time of special praise and prayer.<sup>69</sup>

At the request of Portal, Tucker formally set out his arguments as to why the British government should take over the administration of Uganda: that the latent tensions between the Roman Catholic, Protestant and Muslim parties would erupt into open warfare should the British withdraw. He argued that, if the Muslims should ally with Kabarega in Bunyoro, the result would be 'the practical enslavement of the people and the effacement of all the civilising influences at present at work.'<sup>70</sup> As Director of the mission in Uganda Tucker naturally was concerned that there should be a stable political context in which the work of

evangelisation could proceed unhindered. But his imagination of such a context was limited to a vision of a British Protectorate. He certainly maximised the propaganda appeal that came from his episcopal position, but he completely failed to consult with both missionaries and African Christians within Uganda.

Having established the fundamental British responsibility in Kampala with the raising of the flag, Portal was concerned about the appropriate organisation within the country. To this end he invited Tucker and Bishop Hirth of the White Fathers to meet him on 6 April 1893.<sup>71</sup> They were invited as representatives of the respective Protestant and Catholic chiefs who were not consulted by Portal at this stage. Tucker agreed that the Protestants should make some concessions regarding land and offices, but Hirth was not satisfied. In the end the Bishops came to a compromise, signing a paper to the effect that they would take these proposals to the chiefs in order to persuade them to give their consent.<sup>72</sup> Regarding these negotiations Portal paid official tribute to Tucker: 'I cannot speak too highly of the straightforwardness, the conciliatory tone and attitude and the strong wish for a peaceful settlement even at a sacrifice shown by Bishop Tucker.'<sup>73</sup> His more personal feelings of near exasperation with two strong-willed Bishops surfaced in his communication with his relatives!<sup>74</sup>

One proposal of Portal's that caused a great deal of controversy when Tucker shared it with the chiefs was the peculiar plan of double chieftainships, that is of Catholics and Protestants. His idea was that every chieftainship and office should have two holders, one Protestant and one Catholic. This was an entirely novel proposal, counter to the traditions of the Baganda, and it is hardly surprising that it provoked a strong reaction from the chiefs. In a detailed letter Tucker set out their objections, notwithstanding their sympathy for Portal's principle that people should be judged by their co-religionists. The chiefs felt that the principle could be catered for by an adequate mechanism of appeal to the King in cases of disagreement. But the chiefs expressed their willingness to try and make the system work if Portal should insist, but only under protest.<sup>75</sup>

Tucker's important role in this process was underlined by the fact that it was finally signed by the Protestant chiefs on 19 April 1893 following his careful explanation that this was a treaty between the British government and the Kabaka and chiefs of Uganda and not between the bishops. It is uncertain how much this was done to salve the episcopal conscience and to what extent this explanation was convincing to the Baganda chiefs. Before signing the document Tucker got

the gathering to kneel and he asked God's blessing on what was done.<sup>76</sup>

Tucker was basically satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations and especially with Portal's private assurances that within the system of double chieftainships the Protestants would be the senior partners in the majority of cases. He was satisfied that the principle of religious liberty was granted without disadvantaging the Protestants, and also that he felt the treaty was negotiated in a Christian spirit. He also expressed the fear that some of the CMS supporters in Britain might denounce him for making any concessions at all to the Roman Catholics.<sup>77</sup> Tucker's concern was less that he be denounced for political meddling as a missionary than that he concede the political agenda to the Catholics.

With the completion of Portal's mission in Uganda, Tucker enquired of London whether the CMS Committee would care to invite him to be present in England when Portal returned. The reply came that they were not prepared to do so at that stage, because they felt his continuing presence in Africa was of greater importance. But they would invite him at a later stage should that be thought worthwhile.<sup>78</sup> That came on the 26th October 1893; and Tucker duly departed once more for England.

On his arrival he became almost immediately involved in the matter of Lugard's reputation, which had been under attack for some time by the French White Fathers and their allies. Captain Macdonald had been dispatched to Uganda in order to report on Lugard's conduct, but his report had not been made public. When Tucker wrote to the Foreign Office for a copy in December 1893 he was rebuffed.<sup>79</sup> Nonetheless he was well aware that Macdonald had been very critical of Lugard. He was quick to criticise what he knew of the report and the way in which it had been compiled. He criticised Macdonald's allowing a German journalist, Wolf, to sit and hear evidence with him, feeling *inter alia*, that he was biased against the Protestant mission. Secondly he criticised the refusal of Macdonald to admit evidence from any African, and thirdly, he felt that the failure of Macdonald to call John Roscoe, who as a senior CMS missionary in Uganda was Secretary of the missionary body within the country,<sup>80</sup> constituted another reason why the inquiry should be regarded as 'little else than a solemn farce.'<sup>81</sup> Tucker was firm in his support for Lugard, the opinion which eventually prevailed in Britain.

Tucker remained in the United Kingdom until the British government made a clear decision on their intentions regarding Uganda, although there is no evidence to suggest that Tucker's presence made

any difference to the proceedings. He wrote to Wigram in March 1894 that he was only staying until a decision was announced.<sup>82</sup> He expressed his delight when the announcement of a British Protectorate came the following month, interpreting this as an answer to prayer. His second response was to say that the Society had now to rise to the challenge of evangelisation in Uganda.<sup>83</sup> Walker's comment from Uganda was rather cooler: 'The news that Uganda is to be under British Protection will settle many of the restless feelings that have been floating about.'<sup>84</sup>

### *Conclusion*

Between 1890 and 1894 Tucker's political involvement with Uganda related primarily to the diplomatic realm of Britain's relationship with the country. The fundamental assumption that he brought to the country with him in 1890 was that the IBEA Company in general and Lugard in particular were major factors for stability in the country. Closer to the situation Walker perceived them more acutely as disturbing factors to the extent of believing that the war of 1892 between African Catholics and Protestants would never have occurred without the Company's presence.<sup>85</sup> Tucker was aware that the events of January 1892 required interpretation in political rather than religious terms, but his lack of experience within the country meant that he was unable to develop any real understanding of the political conflicts within Buganda. He assumed that the continued presence of the Company would be the guarantee of relative peace within the country. When it was clear that the Company could no longer afford to remain in Buganda, he assumed that this would best be replaced by a declaration of British Protectorate status. With his activity in the propaganda battle for continuing British political involvement Tucker was pragmatically prepared to utilise any argument that he felt could be effective in winning. Underlying this pragmatism was his conviction that the whole situation was 'divinely ordered'. Throughout Tucker was at one with the most influential voices within CMS. Only W.S. Price as a retired missionary offered a more critical analysis. Tucker's role as a spokesman was given credibility within Britain by his experience within Uganda, but it would be easy to exaggerate his role in the campaign.<sup>86</sup>

By 1890 the African Protestant leaders had resolved among themselves that their best option for securing the future of the Church and their own position would be through seeking and retaining political power in the country. This was in spite of the missionaries' injunctions to concentrate on spiritual matters. The pattern of political development

through the 1890s was one of a convergence of their interest initially with the IBEA Company represented by Lugard and later with the British colonial administration. This convergence of interest would be cemented by the 1900 Uganda Agreement.<sup>87</sup> Like Venn, Tucker was most comfortable in relating to British political authorities and was considerably less at ease with African political institutions. Tucker was very quick to accept the judgment that the best option for political stability in Uganda lay with the establishment of a Protectorate regime. Having made this judgment he was committed personally to forwarding the cause of the Protectorate. This brought about an enduring and serious contradiction with his repetition of the old evangelical shibboleth that he was 'entirely opposed to missionaries mixing themselves up in the political affairs of the country.'<sup>88</sup> This general principle proved unsustainable in practice for a number of reasons. The evangelisation of Uganda took place within a culture in which any separation of religion and politics was alien. There is an obvious limit to the number of exceptions that can be permitted before the principle requires amendment. Even a brief survey of Malawi and Nigeria reveals that the claim that Uganda was unique was tendentious.

But perhaps the most serious effect of the repetition of the shibboleth that missionaries should not be involved in politics was that it precluded any systematic and theological reflection on the precise nature of Christian involvement in political life, which might have been more critical of the option of a Protectorate in Uganda. The story of Tucker's involvement in the establishment of the British Protectorate in Uganda between 1890 and 1894 indicates that in the absence of a more critical paradigm he slipped easily into the dominant mode of the political ideologies of his home culture. It would be facile to claim that his actions brought about a Protectorate in Uganda, but he certainly encouraged the process by which the Protectorate came into being. In the second part of his episcopate in Uganda, Tucker was to prove an admirable advocate of African rights within the framework of the Protectorate.

#### NOTES

Abbreviations in the referencing:

- CMSA – Church Missionary Society Archives
- MUKA – Makerere University, Kampala Archives
- PRO – Public Records Office
- RH – Rhodes House Library
- UJ – Uganda Journal
- UNA – Uganda National Archives

1. This more personal approach focused on Tucker complements the massive survey by H.B. Hansen, *Mission, Church and State in a Colonial Setting*, London, 1984. Hansen concentrates on the African arena and an institutional level of inquiry.
2. Henry Venn, *Instruction to Missionaries*, September 1860, reprinted in W.B. Shenk, *Henry Venn – Missionary Statesman*, New York, 1983 as Appendix II pp. 130-137. This was probably his most complete statement on the subject of missionary involvement in politics.
3. *Ibid.* p. 133.
4. *Ibid.* p. 135.
5. A.R. Tucker: 'Missions and the Development of Uganda' in *World Mission Conference 1910* Vol. VII pp. 73-74.
6. *Ibid.* p. 74.
7. *Ibid.* p. 75.
8. *Ibid.* p. 75.
9. S.C. Neill, *Colonialism and Christian Missions*, London, 1966, p. 303. See also C.P. Groves, *The Planting of Christianity in Africa* Vol. II, London, 1954, p. 206.
10. This, of course, is not to argue that the plans were abandoned because of the missionaries' action. The significant point here is that the missionaries argued the case so publicly at all.
11. E.A. Ayandele, *The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria*, London, 1966, pp. 29ff.
12. *Ibid.* p. 39.
13. Present day Malawi.
14. D. Fraser, *Livingstonia*, Edinburgh, 1915, pp. 20ff; see also J. McCracken, *Politics and Christianity in Malawi 1875-1940*, London, 1977, pp. 59ff.
15. Fraser, 1915, p. 76.
16. McCracken, 1977, p. 157.
17. Note by the Revd Claude O'Flaherty on his father, January 1953. MUKA.
18. Walker to his father, 11/8/1889 CMSA Acc 88.74.
19. Walker to his sister 23/7/1889 CMSA Acc 88.71. See further Walker to his sister 25/8/1889 CMSA Acc 88.75.
20. Walker to his sister 7/6/1889 CMSA Acc 88.60.
21. Walker to his brother 10/10/1889 CMSA Acc 88.83.
22. Walker to his brother 29/12/1889 CMSA Acc 88.89. They were no doubt more interested in the military capabilities than the philanthropic concerns.
23. Walker to his brother 6/3/1891 CMSA Acc 88.136.
24. Walker to Lugard 16/2/1891. Lugard Papers RH MSS Brit Emp S.42.130.
25. Notes of interview between F. Baylis and the Revd R.H. Walker at Salisbury Square in London 23/11/1892 in CMSA G3/A5/P4.
26. Gordon to Lang 2/10/1890 CMSA G3/A5/O1891.
27. Walker to Mrs Savile 9/3/1891 CMSA Acc 88.
28. This conclusion is supported indirectly by the fact that histories of the period by secular Baganda historians pay little regard to the role of the missionaries in this period. See Mitü, 'A Short History of Buganda', 1923 in MUKA and S.R. Karugire, *A Political History of Uganda*, London, 1980.
29. Lugard: Diaries Vol. I p. 231.
30. Lugard: Diaries Vol. II pp. 32-33.
31. Many references in Lugard's Diaries for December 1890 and January 1891. Vol. II pp. 49ff.
32. Lugard: Diaries Vol. II p. 52.
33. R.P. Ashe, 1894, p. 155.
34. Tucker to Wigram 30/12/1890 CMSA G3/A5/O1891.124.
35. Lugard: Diaries Vol. II p. 136, entry for 22/3/1891.
36. Walker to his sister 6/4/1892 CMSA Acc 88.180.

37. For a detailed analysis of the subject of religious liberty in the period of Company rule in Buganda, see Hansen, 1984, pp. 37ff.
38. Baskerville: Journal entries for 13/7/1891 and 14/7/1891 MUKA.
39. R.P. Ashe, *Chronicles of Uganda*, London, 1894, p. 279; Ashe to Lugard 30/4/1892 RH Lugard Papers 42.221.
40. See for instance, Ashe to Lugard 19/2/1892 RH Lugard Papers 42.189. This letter is marked *Important* by Lugard.
41. Report in 'Church Missionary Gleaner' July 1891 and 'Church Missionary Intelligencer' (CMI) July 1891.
42. P.L. McDermott, *British East Africa or IBEA*, London, 1893, p. 193.
43. Tucker to Sir Fowell Buxton 30/7/1891. Copy in RH Lugard Papers 44.110-111.
44. J.S. Galbraith, *Mackinnon and East Africa*, London, 1972 pp. 211-212. See also B.H. Stanley, *The Bible and the Flag*, Leicester, 1990, p. 129.
45. There is little doubt that Tucker would have interpreted this in terms of Providence rather than coincidence.
46. Wigram to Hutchinson 14/9/1891 CMSA G/Y/A7/1/1.
47. The Memorial was reprinted in 'Church Missionary Intelligencer' (CMI) November 1891. The Minutes of the Special General Committee are found in CMSA A5 Precise book for 1891.
48. The Gleaners' Union brought together CMS supporters in Britain for prayer and sharing of missionary information from overseas.
49. Report in 'Church Missionary Intelligencer' December 1891.
50. Mackinnon to Hutchinson 2/11/1891 CMSA G/Y/A7/1/1.
51. For instance see Stanley's speech when he was granted the Freedom of the Town of Swansea, reported in the *Western Mail* 4/10/1892. See also Lugard's letters to the *Times* 8/10/1892 and 17/10/1892. Both of Lugard's letters were reprinted in CMI November 1892.
52. D.A. Low, 'British Public Opinion and the Uganda Question' UJ XVIII/2 1954 pp. 81-100. See also PRO FO 566 Register, which records the receipt of 165 letters about the retention of Uganda in November alone.
53. Tucker to Portal 15/6/1892 Copy in CMSA G3/A5/O1892.227.
54. Portal to Tucker 19/6/1892 Copy in CMSA G3/A5/O1892.230.
55. Tucker to Wigram 13/9/1892 CMSA G3/A5/O1892.383.
56. Tucker in *The Standard* 13/9/1892, reprinted in CMI October 1892.
57. Letter from Baganda chiefs to the Committee of CMS CMSA G3/A5/O1892.385. The signatories were Katikiro Apolo, Nikodemu Sebwato, Mugema Joswa, Henry Duta, Paulo Bakungu, Bataomeyo Musoke, Sitbano Kalibwano, Zakariya Kizito, Yohanna Bunjo, Yohanna Alliyiro, Yonathan Kagizi, and Mika Sematimba.
58. W. Salter Price to Smith 22/10/1888. CMSA G3/A5/P1888.
59. W. Salter Price to Hutchinson 2/1/1892. CMSA G/Y/A7/1/1.
60. Walker to his brother 14/7/1892 CMSA Acc 88.185.
61. Portal to Tucker 21/9/1892. Copy in CMSA G3/A5/O/1892 402.
62. Tucker to Portal 21/9/1892 CMSA G3/A5/O/1892 402.
63. There is something slightly suspicious about this correspondence. Although it cannot be proved, collusion between Portal and Tucker to establish the point would be in the interests of both.
64. J.R.L. Macdonald, 1897, p. 128.
65. Tucker to Stock 30/9/1892 CMSA G3/A5/1892 429.
66. Rosebery to Portal 9/12/1892 RH Portal Papers 113.152.
67. Tucker to Williams 7/1/1893 in UNA. A2/1. See also Tucker to Baylis 11/2/1893 CMSA G3/A5/O/1893 133.
68. Portal to Rosebery 9/4/1893. RH Portal Papers 109.8.

69. Tucker to Stock 30/9/1893 CMSA G3/A5/O1893.232.
70. Tucker to Portal 30/3/1893. UNA. A2/1. This copy is badly damaged. Fortunately there are further copies in CMSA G3/A5/O1893.174 and in Tucker, 1908, Vol. I p. 260.
71. For a detailed discussion of the negotiations, see Hansen, 1984 pp. 59ff and A. Holmberg, *African Tribes and European Agencies*, Goteborg, 1966, pp. 384ff.
72. G. Portal, *The British Mission to Uganda in 1893*, London, 1894, p. 225.
73. Portal to Sir Percy Anderson, Foreign Office 9/4/1893 RH Portal Papers 109.10.
74. Portal to his mother 7/4/1893 and Portal to his wife 4/4/1893. RH Portal Papers 113.225-6.
75. Tucker to Portal 15.4.1893 UNA A2/1.
76. Tucker to Wigram 24/4/1893 CMSA G3/A5/O1893.241 (this letter was marked Private) and Tucker, *Eighteen Years in Uganda and East Africa*, 1908, Vol. I p. 270.
77. Tucker to Wigram 24/4/1893 CMSA G3/A5/O1893.241.
78. Tucker to Wigram 4/4/1893 CMSA G3/A5/O1893.185. The reply is recorded as a Minute of the Group 3 Committee 25/7/1893 in G3/A5/P4.
79. Correspondence in PRO F.O. 566.1642. A copy of the Report itself may be found in UNA A1/1.
80. This committee was known as the Finance Committee, although its brief went far beyond financial matters to deal with any matters with which the missionaries were concerned.
81. Tucker to Lugard 21/12/1893. RH Lugard Papers 44.109.
82. Tucker to Wigram 26/3/1894 CMSA G/AC4/15/2931.
83. Tucker to Wigram 13/4/1894 CMSA G/AC4/15/2916.
84. Walker to his sister 19/6/1894 CMSA Acc 88.235.
85. Walker to Lang 29/9/1892 CMSA G3/A5/O1892.392.
86. One commentator on the saga of the IBEA Company hardly mentioned Tucker at all. See Galbraith, *Mackinnon and East Africa 1878-1895*, Cambridge, 1972.
87. For the best introduction to the Uganda Agreement of 1900, see D.A. Low and R.C. Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule, 1900-1955*, London, 1970, Part I.
88. Tucker in the Edinburgh Report, 1910, Vol. VII p. 75.